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1 See Bonner (2008) for a more comprehensive review of decision aid research within accounting 
2 In many settings, the average estimate of a group of individuals tends to be more accurate than the typical 
individual estimate (Wallsten and Diederich 2001; Surowiecki 2004). This benefit, often called the wisdom of 
crowds, primarily stems from the reduction in noise that comes from averaging multiple estimates. Drawing on the 














                                                
3 While I primarily focus on the audit setting, my theory likely extends beyond auditing to other settings where 




                                                
5 Kennedy et al. (1997) also note that auditors assess justifiability higher when an engagement partner receives 




                                                
6 In other words, I expect the way in which specialists use their knowledge advantage to differ depending on 
whether an auditor is prompted to provide a rapid, initial judgment (vs. unprompted). 
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initial!judgment,!specialist!auditors!will!benefit!more!than!nonNspecialist!auditors!in!the!sense!of!getting!even!closer!to!the!judgments!of!their!evaluators.!! When!specialist!auditors!are!asked!to!revisit!a!rapid,!intuitive!initial!judgment,!they!are!also!likely!to!derive!incremental!benefits!from!their!specialization.!In!particular,!generating!a!second!judgment!after!having!generated!a!rapid,!intuitive!initial!judgment!provides!specialists!with!an!opportunity!to!reconcile!their!intuition!with!their!analytical!processing.!Expert!intuition!often!contains!important!information!that!may!not!be!reflected!in!expert!analytical!judgment!(Hammond!et!al.!1987).!This!valid!information!may!be!lost!if!experts!do!not!separately!consider!their!intuition!or!if!experts!tend!to!use!a!predominantly!analytical!approach.!However,!in!some!cases,!intuitive!judgment!may!be!more!likely!to!be!influenced!by!bias!(c.f.!Evans!2008).!When!asked!to!generate!an!alternative!to!a!rapid,!intuitive!judgment,!specialists!are!given!the!opportunity!to!critically!evaluate!the!degree!to!which!their!intuition!reflects!expertise!and!to!adjust!accordingly.!As!a!result,!specialists!who!generate!a!second!judgment!after!having!made!a!rapid,!intuitive!initial!judgment!will!be!more!likely!to!recognize!bias!in!their!initial!judgment!and!to!adjust!accordingly,!while!still!preserving!some!of!the!valid!information!inherent!in!their!intuition!(c.f.!DenesNRaj!and!Epstein!1994).!Therefore,!I!predict!that!when!specialist!auditors!are!asked!to!generate!a!second!judgment!after!having!made!a!rapid,!intuitive!initial!judgment,!they!will!provide!second!judgments!that!differ!from!the!judgments!of!their!primary!evaluators!to!a!greater!degree!than!those!of!nonNspecialists.7!Overall,!I!predict!that!when!auditors!attempt!to!draw!on!the!crowd!within!with!a!prompted!initial!judgment,!specialists!will!benefit!more!than!nonNspecialists!by!getting!even!farther!from!the!judgments!of!their!evaluators!in!ways!that!
                                                
7 While industry specialist auditors may not fully be experts, they are likely to have more expertise than non-


















                                                
8 By using multiple cases, my findings let me better speak to the generalizability of my theory to audit practice. 
9 As all participants in my experiment have some form of industry specialization, a more precise description would 
be matched (vs. mismatched) specialists, where matched (mismatched) specialists are making judgments on a case 
within (outside of) their area of industry specialization (c.f., Hammersley 2006). For ease of exposition, I refer to 
matched specialists as “specialists” and mismatched specialists as “non-specialists,” as such a description is accurate 
at the case level.  
10 For the majority of my analyses, I examine responses only where participants are not aware ex ante that they will 
be asked to provide both an initial and second judgment. However, I also consider differences across awareness in 




                                                
11 Depending on the preference of their employing firm, participants completed either an electronic (31 participants) 
or a hard copy (169 participants) version of the experimental instrument. My results are insensitive to the inclusion 
of instrument type as a covariate.  
12 I exclude two participants from my analyses because their responses demonstrated a lack of effort on the 
experimental task. For example, one participant provided widely varying responses but every response included a 
four as one of the digits of the response (including demographic information such as the participants’ months and 
years of experience). Further, both participants provided responses that were well outside of the range of possible 
values (e.g. a negative percentage in assessing the most reasonable allowance for doubtful accounts as a percentage 
of accounts receivable). 
13 Four participants did not complete the entire instrument. Where possible, I use partial responses from these 









                                                
14 As I have no theoretical reason to expect differences across case, I collapse across case when performing my 
primary analyses. However, the inclusion of case as a covariate strengthens my results. I also consider differences 
across cases as a supplemental analysis. As it is difficult to hold the strength of a match in specialization across 








                                                
15 I also test my hypotheses using several alternative designations of specialists (using my two measured variables 
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16 Expert panelists were asked to assess four hypothetical judgments that an in-charge auditor could provide. The 
first three judgments were based on the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile responses from senior auditors who had 
participated in the study at that point. The fourth judgment was the client-preferred outcome. Expert panelists 
assessed the justifiability of these hypothetical in-charge judgments on a scale ranging from 0 (clearly not 






                                                
17 I also attempt to measure participant confidence in their judgments by asking participants to provide an 
assessment of upper and lower bounds of the most reasonable range of possible judgments related to the allowance 
account for each case. Wider intervals represent lower confidence, while narrower intervals represent higher 
confidence (compare Trafimow and Sniezek 1994). However, these judgments are provided after auditors have 
already considered reasons why their initial judgment could be wrong. As prompts to consider the opposite tend to 
reduce the effects of overconfidence (Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff 1980), it is unsurprising that I find no 





                                                
18 Factor analysis of the three measures indicates the presence of one common factor explaining over 67% of the 
variance for participants’ assessments of both their initial and alternative judgments (the factor has an eigenvalue of 
2.03; the next highest eigenvalue is 0.59). As the resulting factor weightings suggest an even weighting of the three 
measures, I use the average to facilitate interpretation of the differences across conditions.   
19 For my statistical analyses, I consider a p-value greater than 0.100 to be statistically insignificant, a p-value of 
0.050 or less to be statistically significant, and a p-value less than or equal to 0.100 and greater than 0.050 to be 















                                                
20 For comparability across cases, I scale raw assessments relative to the client-preferred outcome (e.g., 5.0% 
represents a raw judgment that is 5.0% higher than the client-preferred outcome).  
21 As expert panelists were asked to assess the justifiability of the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile responses (in raw 
terms) from senior auditors who had participated in the study at that point, those responses differed across case. For 
that reason, only five expert panelists assessed a hypothetical judgment 5.77%, 10.58% and 25.00% above the 
client-preferred outcome, while seven expert panelists assessed a hypothetical judgment 20.00%, 33.33%, and 
66.67% above the client-preferred outcome.  
22 The twelfth expert panelist provided the most aggressive assessment of the most reasonable allowance amount of 
all expert panelists. While this particular panelist assessed the 25th and 50th percentile responses as being more 
justifiable than the client-preferred outcome, this individual also assessed the 75th percentile response as being the 
least justifiable of the four hypothetical judgments. Overall this pattern is consistent with more conservative 
judgments being more justifiable in the eyes of expert panelists, up to a point. That is, justifiability does not likely 
increase uniformly with conservativeness. However, because I only elicited justifiability assessments within a 
limited range, I am not able to assess the point at which increased conservativeness leads to less justifiable 




                                                
23 Of note, Hoffman and Patton (1997) find that holding auditors accountable to an audience with unknown 
preferences led them to make more conservative judgments. In contrast, when auditors are in a condition where I 
expect them to experience less evaluation apprehension, their judgments become more conservative. This difference 
may be caused by a number of different factors, including cultural shifts in auditing over time, the lack of an actual 










                                                
24 Table 5 and Figure 7 exclude 26 participants who provided identical initial and second judgments. In addition, 
they exclude seven participants who provided final judgments outside of their initial to second judgment range. 
These participants are excluded because their final judgments cannot reliably be interpreted as an implicit weighting 
of their initial and second judgments. Further, the 26 participants who provided identical initial and second 
judgments are the primary focus of my analysis of H1a. In contrast RQ1 focuses on how auditors weight differing 





                                                
25 Analyses (untabulated) comparing differences in the average implicit weighting of participants’ second judgment 
(as described in section 3.4) across conditions reveal fairly similar results. In particular, non-specialist auditors give 







                                                
26 Table 9 and Figure 12 exclude 43 participants who provided identical initial and second judgments. In addition, 
they exclude seven participants who provided final judgments outside of their initial to second judgment range. 
These participants are excluded because their final judgments cannot reliably be interpreted as an implicit weighting 









                                                
27 As with the accuracy gain of auditors’ average judgments when they are aware ex ante, these results should be 
interpreted with caution, as the preceding analysis of raw judgments suggests that final judgment accuracy gain is 
primarily driven by the extreme conservativeness of unprompted specialist auditors’ initial judgments. 
28 In order to facilitate interpretation of combined measures of participants’ concern for how their initial and second 
judgments might reflect on them as an auditor, I reverse coded questions 3 and 4 such that a higher response to any 
of the four questions is suggestive of greater concern.  
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N0.09,!0.94,!and!0.27,!respectively).!I!find!no!statistical!relationship!between!the!first!factor!and!my!primary!independent!and!dependent!variables!(all!p!>!0.100).!!However,!the!second!factor!is!significantly!related!to!my!primary!independent!and!dependent!variables.!I!present!descriptive!statistics!of!auditors’!perceived!ego!threat!in!Panel!A!of!Table!10!(Figure!13!provides!an!illustration!of!my!findings).!Using!this!combined!factor,!I!find!a!marginally!significant!interaction!between!initial!judgment!prompt!and!specialization!(F(1,196)!=!2.22;!oneNtailed!p!=!0.069).!Further,!specialist!auditors!in!the!









                                                
30 For my primary analyses, I use participants’ average accuracy gain across the five general knowledge question. 
However, my results are inferentially identical if I use participants’ median accuracy gain.  
31 This failure to find a difference should be interpreted with caution, as time constraints necessitated a more 
condensed version of the traditional psychological task. In particular, whereas prior psychology studies presented 
questions to participants one at a time, auditor participants in my study provided initial judgments for all five 
general knowledge questions simultaneously, after which they simultaneously provided alternative judgments for all 







                                                
32 Table 13 and Figure 17 exclude 49 participants (22 in the unprompted condition and 27 in the prompted 
condition) who provided identical initial and second judgments. In addition, they exclude six participants who 
provided final judgments outside of their initial to second judgment range. These participants are excluded because 






                                                














                                                
34 Another potential cost of drawing on the crowd within is that auditors may believe that they could expose 
themselves to additional liability if they were to document multiple, differing judgments. However, auditors could 









Manufacturing Case Information 
 
When completing this case, suppose that you are an in-charge on the FY2012 audit of Oltrak, 
Inc. This is your first year auditing Oltrak. The in-charge whom you replaced was very well 
regarded by your manager. 
Company Background 
Oltrak, Inc. is one of the leading global electronic security companies in the world. Oltrak 
designs, manufactures, markets, sells and services innovative electronic products and systems for 
security and surveillance, industrial video and professional audio markets worldwide. The 
technology used in the company’s products has been gradually moving from analog to digital 
processes, but Oltrak continues making some analog models in nearly all of its lines. The 
company has steadily grown, as shown by its increasing sales from $15.8 million in 1997 to 
nearly $300 million in 2012. 
Industry/Competition 
Oltrak faces competition in each of its markets. Some of Oltrak’s existing and potential 
competitors have substantially greater financial, manufacturing, marketing and other resources 
than Oltrak has. To compete successfully, Oltrak must continue to make substantial investments 
in its engineering and development, marketing, sales, customer service and support activities. 
Sales and Receivables 
Historically, sales have been made through two channels with some accounts handled directly by 
the company and the remaining sales made through licensed distributors. Both the sales handled 
directly by Oltrak and those to licensed distributors are recorded when shipped, which is 
consistent with the Company’s policy of shipping FOB shipping point. 
Sales terms are 2% discount for payment within 10 days with the net due within 30 days. 
Receivables are recorded for the gross invoice amount and discounts are recorded when taken. 
Accounts are written off only after extensive collection efforts are taken. The allowance for 
doubtful accounts is based on an analysis of accounts outstanding as determined necessary by 
management. 
Last year at December 31, 2011, Oltrak had about 1,000 active credit customers (both 
distributors and accounts handled directly by the company). No single customer’s annual sales 







Preliminary Analytical Procedures 
The table below presents year-end data and analytical procedures performed with the year-end 
numbers. 
( Amounts(in(Thousands((000)(at(December(31,!
Key(Financial(Statement(Data:( 2008( 2009( 2010( 2011( 2012(
(((Net(sales( $208,568! $248,972! $275,797! $270,660! $293,997!
(((Net(income((loss)( $2,239! $3,361! $4,977! $5,411! $4,458!
(((Accounts(receivable( $27,760! $34,493! $34,895! $38,055! $52,208!
(((Allowance(for(DA(&(sales(returns( $3,028! $4,071! $3,873! $4,684! $5,440!
(((Total(assets( $207,012! $231,570! $255,614! $260,455! $270,896!
Selected(Analytical(Procedures:!
(((Days(Sales(in(Accounts(
Receivable! 48.6! 50.6! 46.2! 51.3! 64.8!!!!Allowance(for(DA(as(%(of(AR( 10.9%! 11.8%! 11.1%! 12.3%! 10.4%!
 
Although we now have the December 31, 2012 numbers to audit (as shown above) the analytical 
procedures were initially performed before year end, in early December 2012, using data 
from the November 2012 unaudited consolidated financial statements of Oltrak and 
its subsidiaries. These numbers are not presented in the table above but are discussed next. 
 
Preliminary analytical procedures showed that Days Sales in Accounts Receivable increased 
during the period from 51.3 at December 2011 to 54.4 at November 2012. Management 
explained that Oltrak instituted a new marketing strategy in mid-November that led to the 
increase. Management made a strategic decision to reallocate marketing responsibilities among 
its sales channels. Specifically, responsibility for all sales of analog products was turned over to 
the distributors and Oltrak focused its marketing efforts on the digital products. 
To implement this plan, distributors were given access to all of Oltrak’s analog accounts which 
was roughly half of the smaller customers previously serviced directly by Oltrak, while Oltrak 
continued to service the larger, digital accounts directly. Also, distributors were given significant 
incentives to buy analog products in mid-November and December. These incentives included 
profit sharing opportunities, favorable financing terms, and providing warehousing and storage 
incentives. 
Management believes the marketing initiative will be very successful, as many distributors 
placed orders of analog systems in the second half of November and in December. At year-end, 
Days Sales in AR increased further to 64.8. Management explained that, by year-end, over 90 
percent of the distributors had signed up for the program and placed orders for analog products. 
In discussing Days Sales in AR with management, it was noted that this ratio doesn’t tell the 
entire story because much of the increase in AR is due to sales that were outstanding for less than 
30 days at year-end because November 15th was the date the new marketing strategy was 
implemented. A review of the December 31, 2012 aging of Accounts Receivable showed that the 
percentage of total AR in the current column (less than 30 days) increased significantly relative 
to 2011. This is reflected in the reduced reserve in the allowance for doubtful accounts, which is 
10.4% of Accounts Receivable as of December 31, 2012, down from 12.3% at December 31, 
2011. 
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Results of Interim Tests 
Prior to year-end 2012, the audit team tested internal controls over the Sales and Collections 
Cycle. At the same time, Sales and Cash Receipts transactions were also tested. Results of these 
tests indicated that computer and manual controls over Sales and Cash Receipts were in place 
and working effectively. The audit team has assessed control risk in this cycle as low for the 
following internal control objectives: classification, authorization, completeness, 
timeliness/cutoff, accuracy and validity. 
Manufacturing Case Primary Judgment 
 
Oltrak’s management reserved an allowance for doubtful accounts and sales returns of 10.4% of 
accounts receivable for 2012. It is likely that adjustments to the allowance for doubtful accounts 
will influence whether or not Oltrak’s earnings will beat analysts’ forecasts and prior year 
earnings per share, meaning that even small changes will likely be material for qualitative 
reasons. Please give your assessment of the most reasonable allowance for doubtful accounts as 
a percentage of AR:   
 




Financial Services Case Information 
 
When completing this case, suppose that you are an in-charge on the FY2012 audit of Retail 
Credit, Incorporated (RCI). This is your first year auditing RCI. The in-charge whom you 
replaced was very well regarded by your manager.  
 
Company Background 
RCI is the financing arm of Retail Clothes Land, Incorporated, which is a mid-sized, upscale 
retailer organization. RCI is a non-bank organization that securitizes credit card debt on a 
routine, recurring basis. That is, after pooling similar classes of credit card receivables, RCI sells, 
for example, 90% of the underlying cash flows while retaining 10% of the underlying cash flows 
(i.e., the retained interest). Importantly, RCI retains the risk for 100% of the underlying cash 
flows. As individual customers default on credit card payments, RCI is in a first-loss position. If 
losses occur, RCI is first to absorb the loss for the entire credit card receivable out of the 10% it 
keeps as retained interest. Plus, if losses occur in excess of RCI's retained interest, RCI is 
generally expected, but not legally obligated, to cover the losses. Consequently, if collection 
problems were to arise, holders of the securitized portion of the credit card receivables would 
face less risk than would RCI. 
 
Historically, RCI has profited on securitization by investing the proceeds of the securitized 
portion in financial instruments that earn returns greater than would have been earned from the 
underlying credit card cash flows alone.  
 
All of RCI’s securitization VIEs are consolidated because RCI is considered to be the primary 




Allowance for Loan Losses 
 
RCI’s allowance for loan losses is an important indicator of the riskiness of the company’s loan 
portfolio. In general, RCI’s allowance for loan losses is primarily based on the risk of default. 
This risk reflects potential non-collection of the securitized receivables. The risk of default is 
influenced by:   
 
(a) The credit rating of the individuals owing money on their credit cards.  
 
(b) The terms upon which credit is extended to customers and the efforts of 
management to control whether credit is extended according to those terms.  
(c) The pre-payment rate on the underlying individual credit cards.  
(d) Macroeconomic factors that may affect the probability of individual credit 
 cardholders paying off their balances, such as macroeconomic interest rates 
and inflation.  
RCI relies on multiple benchmarks to determine the most appropriate allowance for loan losses. 
One important benchmark is the allowance for credit card loan losses as a percentage of 
outstanding credit card loans for other firms that routinely engage in credit card securitizations. 
Discover, one of the largest credit card issuers in the world, and one of the most stable managers 
of credit, has an allowance for credit card loan losses that represents 3.1% of outstanding credit 
card loans (per its most recent 10-K filing with the SEC). Bank of America and Citibank hold 
riskier portfolios of credit card debt, and their allowances for credit card loan losses as a 
percentage of outstanding credit card loans are shown in the table below: ! 2011( 2012( Change(
Bank(of(America( 6.2%! 5.0%! N1.2%!
Discover( 4.4%! 3.1%! N1.3%!
Citibank( 8.6%! 6.6%! N2.0%!
RCI( 4.6%( 3.0%( e1.6%(
Management asserts that RCI’s customer base is more affluent than the industry average and, 
therefore, its credit card loans are subject to lower default risk and higher prepayment rates than 
most other credit card rates.  
As shown in the table above, RCI’s allowance for loan losses represented 4.6% of the company’s 
outstanding credit card loans in FY2011. RCI management has said, “In order to reflect 
adequately the decreasing volatility in the market and the affluent nature of our customer 




Audit Evidence Obtained thus Far Regarding RCI’s Allowance for Loan Losses 
 
Summary. As explained below, the credit ratings of RCI customers, customers’ default rates, 
and macroeconomic conditions are each substantially the same as they were last year. But, RCI’s 
policies regarding the extension of credit and the customer prepayment rates have changed. 
 
Factors that are substantially the same as last year: 
 
The credit ratings (FICO scores) of RCI’s customers. In an initial interview with RCI 
management, they noted, “Compared to the largest organizations that mass market credit cards to 
customers, our customer base is relatively affluent. Our parent company is an upscale retailer. 
The credit scores of our customers are relatively good.” After some initial audit test work, 
you’ve learned that RCI’s credit card customers have credit scores as follows on the table, 
below. You’ve confirmed that they do indicate good credit scores, overall. These credit ratings 
are current as of RCI’s last inquiry with the credit bureaus, which, for each cardholder, is usually 





of(Receivables(599!and!Below! Very!Poor! 6.1%!600!–!619! Poor! 17.5%!620!–!659! Moderate! 25.8%!660!–!699! Good! 34.9%!700!and!above! Very!Good! 15.7%!
Total( ! 100.0%(
 
Default rates. The default rate on RCI’s credit cards has not changed substantially from prior 
years.  
 
Macroeconomic factors. In the continuing aftermath of the financial crisis, the supply and 
demand of commercial and consumer credit in many (but not all) markets continues to be 
restricted. 
 
Factors that have changed since last year: 
 
RCI’s extension of credit. A review of RCI’s underwriting manual shows that their control 
policies for credit card issuance and maintenance reflect best practices. However RCI recently 
began increasing the extent to which it has extended credit on generous terms (no-interest-for-
18-months and higher credit limits). Management says this change was made to attract more 
customers and boost revenue per customer. Frequently, these credit terms have been extended to 
existing credit cardholders without re- checking their credit (since first issuing their credit cards). 
RCI management maintains that new credit checks would have been costly and would have 
unnecessarily inconvenienced their affluent customers, which would threaten their loyalty. 
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RCI’s customer prepayment rates. Lower prepayment rates reflect higher default risk. 
Benchmark prepayment rates are displayed in the table below. 
 
( 2011( 2012( Change(
Bank(of(America( 14.6%! 15.4%! +!0.8%!
Discover( 19.2%! 19.4%! +!0.2%!
Citibank( 18.2%! 18.8%! +!0.6%!
RCI( 15.6%! 12.4%! N!3.2%!
 
As indicated, RCI’s prepayment rate was 15.6% in 2011 and 12.4% in 2012. RCI’s management 
explains that its prepayment rate is low relative to Citibank and Bank of America, due to the 
effects of generous introductory terms (e.g.—no interest for 18 months) recently offered by RCI. 
Management anticipates that RCI’s prepayment rates will “catch up” as these introductory terms 
expire. 
 
Financial Services Case Primary Judgment 
 
RCI’s management reserved an allowance for loan losses of 3.0% of outstanding loans for 2012. 
It is likely that adjustments to the allowance for doubtful accounts will influence whether or not 
RCI’s earnings will beat analysts’ forecasts and prior year earnings per share, meaning that even 
small changes will likely be material for qualitative reasons. Please give your assessment of the 
most reasonable allowance for loan losses as a percentage of outstanding loans:   
 
 




Ego Threat Questions (participants used the scale below for each question) 
 
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| 
-5   -4   -3   -2   -1    0    1    2    3    4    5a 




1. I felt that revisions to my initial assessment of the allowance for doubtful accounts 
would reflect poorly on my expertise as an auditor. 
2. When reconsidering my initial assessment of the allowance … account, I felt that it 
would be a sign of weakness to change my mind. 
3. I felt that it would be wise to change my mind when revisiting my initial assessment 
of the allowance for doubtful accounts. 
4. When assessing the appropriateness of an allowance … account, a good auditor will 



















































































Manipulation!Check Specialization!Measure Demographic!Measures 
Prompt!Manipulation!Unprompted!vs.!Prompted 











































































































































0This!figure!illustrates!the!observed!proportion!of!auditors’!who!gave!100%,!50%,!or!0%!weight!to!their!second!judgment!(vs.!their!initial!judgment)!when!making!their!final!judgment!across!my!manipulations!of!processing!method!and!specialization.!This!figure!excludes 26 participants who provided identical initial and 
second judgments. In addition, this figure excludes seven participants who provided final judgments outside of their 
initial to second judgment range. These participants are excluded because their final judgments cannot reliably be 
































































































































































 0This!figure!illustrates!the!observed!proportion!of!auditors’!who!gave!100%,!50%,!or!0%!weight!to!their!second!judgment!(vs.!their!initial!judgment)!when!making!their!final!judgment!across!my!manipulations!of!processing!method!and!specialization,!when!auditors!knew!ex!ante!that!they!would!be!asked!to!provide!both!an!initial!judgment!and!a!second!judgment.!This!figure excludes 43 participants who provided identical initial 
and second judgments. In addition, this figure excludes seven participants who provided final judgments outside of 
their initial to second judgment range. These participants are excluded because their final judgments cannot reliably 









































































































































































 0This!figure!illustrates!the!observed!proportion!of!auditors’!who,!in!answering!general!knowledge!questions,!gave!100%,!50%,!or!0%!weight!to!their!second!judgment!(vs.!their!initial!judgment)!when!making!their!final!judgment!across!my!manipulation!of!processing!method.!This!figure!excludes 49 participants (22 in the 
unprompted condition and 27 in the prompted condition) who provided identical initial and second judgments. In 
addition, this figure excludes six participants who provided final judgments outside of their initial to second 
judgment range. These participants are excluded because their final judgments cannot reliably be interpreted as an 
















































































Initial!Judgment!Prompt! ! Specialization! ! ! ! Initial!vs.!Second!Judgment!!! 00 n0 00 Identical0 00 Different0Unprompted! ! Specialists! ! 16! ! 4! ! 12!! ! ! ! ! ! [25%]! ! [75%]!! ! NonNspecialists! ! 84! ! 11! ! 73!! ! !! !! !! !! [13%]! !! [87%]!
0 ! Subtotal0 ! 100! ! 15! ! 85!!! !! !! !! !! !! [15%]! !! [85%]!Prompted! ! Specialists! ! 22! ! 0! ! 22!! ! ! ! ! ! [0%]! ! [100%]!! ! NonNspecialists! ! 78! ! 11! ! 67!! ! !! !! !! !! [14%]! !! [86%]!
0 ! Subtotal0 ! 100! ! 11! ! 89!!! !! !! !! !! !! [11%]! !! [89%]!
(
Panel(B:(Planned(comparison(tests(using(Fisher's(Exact(Test(Source! !! !! 00 !! !! !! pNvalue!





Tests0of0Hypothesis01b0and0RQ1:0Accuracy0Gain0! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Panel(A:(Participants'((n"=(200)(mean([standard(deviation](accuracy(gain((loss)(across(
judgments(Initial!Judgment!Prompt! ! Specialization! ! ! ! Average0vs.0 ! Final0vs.0 ! Average0vs.0!! 00 n0 00 Initial0 00 Initial0 00 Final0Unprompted! ! Specialists! ! 16! ! 8.98%! ! 13.05%! ! N4.07%!! ! ! ! ! ! [17.12%]! ! [33.77%]! ! [18.28%]!! ! NonNspecialists! ! 84! ! 2.76%! ! 2.92%! ! N0.17%!! ! ! ! ! ! [13.79%]! ! [25.87%]! ! [13.70%]!Prompted! ! Specialists! ! 22! ! N10.51%! ! N20.36%! ! 9.85%!! ! ! ! ! ! [53.02%]! ! [95.59%]! ! [42.93%]!! ! NonNspecialists! ! 78! ! 2.25%! ! 1.73%! ! 0.52%!! ! ! ! ! ! [10.80%]! ! [18.70%]! ! [12.88%]!!
Panel(B:(ANOVA(model(of(accuracy(gain((loss)(from(averaging(vs.(intial(judgment(Source! !! !! !! df0 !! MeanNSquare! !! FNratio! !! pNvalue!Initial!Judgment!Prompt!(Prompt)!
0
1! ! 0.30! ! 6.70! ! 0.005*!Specialist! ! ! ( 1! ! 0.03! ! 0.71! ! 0.399!Prompt!x!Specialist! ! ! 1! ! 0.27! ! 6.04! ! 0.008*!Error! ! ! ! 196! ! 0.05! ! ! ! !!





Panel(D:(ANOVA(model(of(accuracy(gain((loss)(from(final(vs.(initial(judgment(Source! !! !! !! df0 !! MeanNSquare! !! FNratio! !! pNvalue!Initial!Judgment!Prompt!(Prompt)!
0
1! ! 0.90! ! 6.07! ! 0.015!Specialist! ! ! ( 1! ! 0.11! ! 0.73! ! 0.395!Prompt!x!Specialist! ! ! 1! ! 0.78! ! 5.26! ! 0.023!Error! ! ! ! 196! ! 0.15! ! ! ! !!












































































































































































































































































deviation]&percentage&above&clientApreferred&outcome&&Initial!Judgment!Prompt! ! Specialization! ! ! ! Judgment!!! %% n% %% Initial% %% Second%Unprompted! ! Specialists! ! 16! ! 43.83%! ! 34.67%!! ! ! ! ! ! [67.43%]! ! [28.04%]!! ! NonDspecialists! ! 84! ! 30.79%! ! 32.68%!! ! ! ! ! ! [56.60%]! ! [37.17%]!
% ! Subtotal% !! 100! !! 32.87%! !! 33.00%!!! !! !! !! !! !! [58.29%]! !! [35.75%]!Prompted! ! Specialists! ! 22! ! 38.73%! ! 70.49%!! ! ! ! ! ! [52.14%]! ! [220.30%]!! ! NonDspecialists! ! 78! ! 32.07%! ! 40.77%!! ! ! ! ! ! [46.90%]! ! [48.31%]!
% ! Subtotal% !! 100! !! 33.54%! !! 47.31%!!! !! !! !! !! !! [47.91%]! !! [103.49%]!!
Panel&B:&Repeated&measures&ANOVA&model&of&absolute&deviation&of&auditors'&
judgment&relative&to&clientApreferred&outcome&Source! !! !! !! df% !! MeanDSquare! !! FDratio! !! pDvalue!Between!Subjects!Effects:!




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Initial'Judgment'Prompt' ' Specialization' ' ' ' Initial'vs.'Second'Judgment''' %% n% %% Identical% %% Different%Unprompted' ' Specialists' ' 27' ' 4' ' 23'' ' ' ' ' ' [15%]' ' [85%]'' ' NonDspecialists' ' 69' ' 17' ' 52'' ' '' '' '' '' [25%]' '' [75%]'
% ' Subtotal% ' 96' ' 21' ' 75''' '' '' ' '' ' [22%]' '' [78%]'Prompted' ' Specialists' ' 25' ' 4' ' 21'' ' ' ' ' ' [16%]' ' [84%]'' ' NonDspecialists' ' 72' ' 18' ' 54'' ' '' '' '' '' [25%]' '' [75%]'
% ' Subtotal% ' 97' ' 22' ' 75''' '' '' '' '' '' [23%]' '' [77%]'
&
Panel&B:&FollowHup&tests&using&Fisher's&Exact&Test&Source' '' '' %% '' '' '' pDvalue'
Unprompted'Specialists'vs.'All'Other'Conditions'
% ' ' ' 0.455'Prompted'Specialists'vs.'All'Other'Conditions'








judgments&Initial'Judgment'Prompt' ' Specialization' ' ' ' Average%vs.% ' Final%vs.% ' Average%vs.%'' %% n% %% Initial% %% Initial% %% Final%Unprompted' ' Specialists' ' 27' ' 20.45%' ' 39.99%' ' D19.53%'' ' ' ' ' ' [108.02%]' ' [215.58%]' ' [108.09%]'' ' NonDspecialists' ' 69' ' D0.88%' ' D1.53%' ' 0.64%'' ' ' ' ' ' [6.69%]' ' [10.42%]' ' [6.50%]'Prompted' ' Specialists' ' 25' ' D0.07%' ' D7.18%' ' 7.12%'' ' ' ' ' ' [13.77%]' ' [46.28%]' ' [34.25%]'' ' NonDspecialists' ' 72' ' 2.40%' ' 2.21%' ' 0.19%'' ' ' ' ' ' [12.92%]' ' [18.07%]' ' [7.42%]''
Panel&B:&ANOVA&model&of&accuracy&gain&(loss)&from&averaging&vs.&initial&judgment&Source' '' '' '' df% '' MeanDSquare' '' FDratio' '' pDvalue'Initial'Judgment'Prompt'(Prompt)'
%
1' ' 0.28' ' 1.65' ' 0.201'Specialist' ' ' & 1' ' 0.34' ' 1.98' ' 0.161'Prompt'x'Specialist' ' ' 1' ' 0.54' ' 3.15' ' 0.078'Error' ' ' ' 189' ' 0.17' ' ' ' ''





Panel&D:&ANOVA&model&of&accuracy&gain&(loss)&from&final&vs.&initial&judgment&Source' '' '' '' df% '' MeanDSquare' '' FDratio' '' pDvalue'Initial'Judgment'Prompt'(Prompt)'
%
1' ' 1.79' ' 2.62' ' 0.107'Specialist' ' ' & 1' ' 0.98' ' 1.43' ' 0.233'Prompt'x'Specialist' ' ' 1' ' 2.46' ' 3.60' ' 0.059'Error' ' ' ' 189' ' 0.68' ' ' ' ''








deviation]&percentage&above&client&preferred&outcome&&Initial'Judgment'Prompt' ' Specialization' ' ' ' Judgment''' %% n% %% Initial% %% Second%Unprompted' ' Specialists' ' 27' ' 124.67%' ' 69.30%'' ' ' ' ' ' [425.79%]' ' [121.29%]'' ' NonDspecialists' ' 69' ' 29.73%' ' 32.02%'' ' ' ' ' ' [32.48%]' ' [38.95%]'
% ' Subtotal% '' 96' '' 56.43%' '' 42.51%''' '' '' '' '' '' [228.51%]' '' [73.46%]'Prompted' ' Specialists' ' 25' ' 47.69%' ' 51.15%'' ' ' ' ' ' [90.93%]' ' [113.83%]'' ' NonDspecialists' ' 72' ' 33.56%' ' 30.60%'' ' ' ' ' ' [43.11%]' ' [35.36%]'
% ' Subtotal% '' 97' '' 37.20%' '' 35.89%''' '' '' '' '' '' [58.99%]' '' [65.16%]'
%
Panel&B:&Repeated&measures&ANOVA&model&of&absolute&deviation&of&auditors'&
judgment&from&the&mean&expert&panel&judgment&Source' '' '' '' df% '' MeanDSquare' '' FDratio' '' pDvalue'Between'Subjects'Effects:'












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































threat.&Initial!Judgment!Prompt! ! Specialization! ! ! ! Perceived((!! (( n( (( Ego(Threat(Unprompted! ! Specialists! ! 16! ! 90.55!! ! ! ! ! ! [1.87]!! ! Non9specialists! ! 83! ! 91.30!! ! ! ! ! ! [2.27]!Prompted! ! Specialists! ! 22! ! 91.96!! ! ! ! ! ! [2.42]!! ! Non9specialists! ! 78! ! 91.44!! ! ! ! ! ! [2.45]!!
Panel&B:&ANOVA&model&of&auditors'&perceived&ego&threat&Source! !! !! !! df( !! Mean9Square! !! F9ratio! !! p9value!Initial!Judgment!Prompt!(Prompt)!
(
1! ! 18.04! ! 3.32! ! 0.035*!Specialist! ! ! & 1! ! 0.40! ! 0.07! ! 0.786!Prompt!x!Specialist! ! ! 1! ! 12.06! ! 2.22! ! 0.069*!Error! ! ! ! 196! ! 5.44! ! ! ! !!









Initial!Judgment!Prompt! ! !! ! ! ! Judgment!!! (( n( (( Initial( (( Second(Unprompted! ! ! ! 97! ! 90.44! ! 0.15!! ! ! ! ! ! [2.00]! ! [1.98]!Prompted! ! ! ! 98! ! 0.89! ! 90.87!! ! ! ! ! ! [1.86]! ! [1.91]!(
Panel&B:&Repeated&measures&ANOVA&model&of&the&degree&to&which&auditors’&
judgments&were&intuitive&vs.&analytical&Source! !! !! !! df( !! Mean9Square! !! F9ratio! !! p9value!Between!Subjects!Effects:!
( ! ! ! ! ! ! !! Initial!Judgment!Prompt!(Prompt)! & 1! ! 2.53! ! 0.65! ! 0.423!! Error! ! ! ( 193! ! 3.92! ! ! ! !Within!Subjects!Effects:! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! Judgment! ! ! ! 1! ! 33.58! ! 9.35! ! 0.003!! Judgment!x!Prompt! ! 1! ! 135.18! ! 37.64! ! <0.001*!! Error! ! ! ! 193! ! 3.59! ! ! ! !(




















by&case&Initial!Judgment!Prompt! ! Specialization! ! ! ! Financial(Services( ! ! ! Manufacturing(!! (( n( (( Case( (( n( (( Case(Unprompted! ! Specialists! ! 10! ! 9.11%! ! 6! ! 8.77%!! ! ! ! ! ! [21.36%]! ! ! ! [7.59%]!! ! Non9specialists! ! 39! ! 0.31%! ! 45! ! 4.88%!! ! ! ! ! ! [7.90%]! ! ! ! [17.18%]!Prompted! ! Specialists! ! 9! ! 927.73%! ! 13! ! 1.42%!! ! ! ! ! ! [82.11%]! ! ! ! [6.85%]!! ! Non9specialists! ! 39! ! 1.87%! ! 39! ! 2.64%!! ! ! ! ! ! [8.29%]! ! ! ! [12.94%]!!
Panel&B:&ANOVA&model&of&accuracy&gain&(loss)&from&averaging&vs.&initial&judgment—
financial&services&case&Source! !! !! !! df( !! Mean9Square! !! F9ratio! !! p9value!Initial!Judgment!Prompt!(Prompt)!
(
1! ! 0.48! ! 7.00! ! 0.005*!Specialist! ! ! & 1! ! 0.17! ! 2.43! ! 0.122!Prompt!x!Specialist! ! ! 1! ! 0.56! ! 8.30! ! 0.003*!Error! ! ! ! 93! ! 0.07! ! ! ! !!






manufacturing&case&Source! !! !! !! df( !! Mean9Square! !! F9ratio! !! p9value!Initial!Judgment!Prompt!(Prompt)!
(
1! ! 0.03! ! 1.55! ! 0.109*!Specialist! ! ! & 1! ! 0.00! ! 0.12! ! 0.730!Prompt!x!Specialist! ! ! 1! ! 0.01! ! 0.44! ! 0.255*!Error! ! ! ! 99! ! 0.02! ! ! ! !!
Panel&E:&FollowJup&tests—manufacturing&case&Source! !! df( !! F9ratio! !! p9value!Simple!Effects!! ! ! ! ! ! !! Unprompted!vs.!Prompted(given!Specialists! 1! ! 1.09! ! 0.150*!! Unprompted(vs.(Prompted(given!Non;specialists! 1! ! 0.51! ! 0.238*!! Specialists(vs.!Non;specialists!given(Unprompted! 1! ! 0.39! ! 0.266*!! Specialists(vs.!Non;specialists!given(Prompted! 1! ! 0.07! ! 0.395*!!This!table!presents!descriptive!statistics!for!differences!in!accuracy!gain!using!average!judgments!across!my!manipulations!of!initial!judgment!prompt!and!specialization,!with!results!separated!by!case.!While!this!table!also!presents!tests!of!those!differences,!the!results!of!those!tests!should!be!interpreted!with!caution!due!to!the!low!sample!sizes!for!specialists!when!partitioning!across!case.!!!
Unprompted(vs.!Prompted(refers!to!the!manner!in!which!participants!were!asked!to!provide!an!initial!judgment.!In!the!unprompted(condition,!auditors!are!not!prompted!to!provide!an!initial!judgment!in!any!particular!way.!In!the!prompted!condition,!auditors!are!asked!to!provide!a!rapid,!intuitive!initial!judgment.!Participants!in!both!conditions!provide!a!second!judgment!that!accounts!for!reasons!why!their!initial!judgment!could!be!wrong.!!!
Specialist!vs.!Non;Specialist!refers!to!whether!auditors!are!specialists!in!the!case!area.!!*Reported!p9values!for!these!tests!are!one9tailed!given!my!directional!predictions;!all!other!reported!p9values!are!two9tailed.!!
